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Abstract
Many doctors in developing countries provide considerably lower levels of quality to
their patients than they have been trained to provide. The gap between best practice
and actual performance is diﬃcult to measure for individual doctors who diﬀer in levels
of training and experience and who face very diﬀerent types of patients. We exploit the
Hawthorne eﬀect—in which doctors change their behavior when a researcher comes to
observe their practices—to measure the gap between best and actual performance. We
analyze this gap for a sample of doctors, examining the impact of the organization for
which doctors work on the performance of doctors, after controlling for their ability.
We ﬁnd that some organizations succeed in motivating doctors to work at levels of
performance that are close to their best possible practice. This paper adds to recent
evidence that motivation is at least as important to health care quality as training and
knowledge.
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cmasatu@cedha.ac.tzTraining, ability and capacity are clearly necessary for the delivery of health services in
low-income countries. However, there is evidence that these inputs are not suﬃcient; many
doctors choose not to do what they have the knowledge and capacity to do.1 In developed
countries, the presumption that doctors do not always use their knowledge and skills in
their patients’ best interests—imperfect agency—drives much of the research on health care.
In such settings, contracts and regulation are seen to improve the quality of care without
increasing doctors’ capacities. Clearly, most developing countries lag far behind developed
countries in the capacities of their of health care sectors, but they also lag in their ability
to regulate the behavior of health care providers. Thus, even in settings where capacity is
clearly insuﬃcient, imperfect agency may reduce quality below even the low level of capacity.
One important step to understanding the degree to which doctors underperform and how
institutions can reduce or eliminate this behavior is to measure the gap between a doctor’s
best possible care and the care that he chooses to provide to his patients—coined the “know-
do gap” by Maestad and Torsvik (2008), and described by Das and Hammer (2007b) and
Leonard et al. (2007). In this paper, we advance an experimental methodology that allows
us to measure both best possible and actual care for a doctor performing the same activities
with the same types of patients, and therefore to document this gap. We examine the gap
between best and actual practice for two key activities in a sample of doctors from Arusha
region in Tanzania and then show how institutional features of these doctor’s practices are
correlated with the size of this gap.
In our study of health care quality in Arusha region, we discovered that our research team
caused a distinct Hawthorne eﬀect, in which the act of being observed alters the subject’s
behavior.2 In particular, when a doctor on our research team arrived to observe a doctor
1 For empirical evidence that doctors in developed countries underperform relative to their capacities,
see Banerjee et al. (2004a,b); Chaudhury and Hammer (2004); Das and Hammer (2005, 2007a); Das and
Sohnesen (2007); Filmer et al. (2000); Leonard and Masatu (2005, 2007).
2This eﬀect was originally documented in Mayo (1933), and is well-described by Benson (2000). Both the
methodology of the original experiment and the description of the Hawthorne eﬀect have since been called
into question (Jones, 1992; Kolata, 1998; Wickstrom and Bendix, 2000), but the original understanding of
this eﬀect has survived these debates.
2in the course of his regular outpatient consultation, the observed doctor changed the way
he practiced medicine and signiﬁcantly improved the quality of care provided. Surprisingly,
these same doctors gradually revert to their normal behavior even while the research team
is present. We suggest that the arrival of another doctor puts the subject doctor under
high-scrutiny and increases the implied demand for professional behavior. This eﬀect likely
depends crucially on the shared training and profession of the researcher and the subject.
However, because the researchers are passive and do not provide feedback and because the
subject has no direct incentive to impress the researcher, the level of scrutiny and the implied
demand for professional behavior both fall over time. The fact that the subject reacts to
both high and low levels of scrutiny in the presence of the research team means that we can
observe high and low levels of eﬀort with the same quality measurement instrument and with
a doctor’s normal patients. The high scrutiny implied when the researcher ﬁrst arrives alters
the way the observed doctor treats his patients but it does not alter his capacity to provide
care. Thus, the superior quality of care provided in the presence of the research team reveals
an achievable, higher level of care that can be compared to the actual level of care.
To demonstrate the potential for this research methodology, we examine two distinct
measures of quality; diagnostic quality (eﬀort exerted to ﬁnd the correct diagnosis) and
whether the doctor ordered a lab test for the patient. We measure diagnostic quality as the
proportion of medically recommended questions and physical examinations actually asked or
performed while examining the patient; quality is higher when doctors ask more questions
and examine the patient more carefully. We show that the average doctor provides about 50%
of the recommended inputs for the average patient, but increases his provision of eﬀort by 10
percentage points when our research team ﬁrst arrives. Importantly, for some organizations
in our data, there is almost no gap between best and actual performance, whereas for other
organizations, the gap is much higher. We argue that doctors who do not increase their
performance signiﬁcantly in the presence of the research team are those doctors who were
already performing at high levels—levels close to their capacity—and who therefore cannot
3increase the quality of care when subjected to additional scrutiny. On the other hand,
doctors who do exhibit large changes in performance are those who were not performing
at levels close to best practice and who therefore can easily increase their input levels in
response to additional scrutiny. In other words, doctors who are normally under high levels
of scrutiny have already increased their eﬀort, whereas those who are normally under low
levels of scrutiny have not.
For the use of lab tests, however, it is more diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate high from low quality
simply by observing the doctor’s activities. Low levels of use might indicate a facility that
is not suﬃciently careful in diagnosing their patients, but high levels of use may indicate
supplier-induced demand. In addition, if patients select doctors according to their condition,
one doctor might only see patients requiring lab tests while another doctor only sees patients
who do not need tests. Thus, use of the laboratory by itself does not reveal quality. We
propose that subjecting doctors to additional scrutiny by a peer may cause them to alter their
behavior in favor of professional standards. Thus, the Hawthorne eﬀect reveals whether a
doctor believes he is using the laboratory in a professional or ethical manner. We ﬁnd that,
whereas most doctors increase their use of laboratory tests when the research team ﬁrst
arrives (and subsequently decrease their use), doctors in one organization have the opposite
pattern: they signiﬁcantly reduce their use of tests when the research team ﬁrst arrives,
allowing the rate to rise over time. Importantly, this organization is suspected of engaging
in supplier-induced demand to the detriment of their patients. Thus, even when we cannot
objectively evaluate an organization’s activities, the behavior of doctors may suggest that
they do not believe they are practicing at the best possible levels of care.
The association between the know-do gap and key institutional characteristics of a doc-
tor’s practice conﬁrm the ﬁndings of Das and Hammer (2007b) and Leonard et al. (2007) in
which ability and practice quality were measured using diﬀerent instruments. Speciﬁcally,
these papers show that, when tested on their knowledge of medical protocols with case study
patients (vignettes), most doctors exert far more eﬀort than they do with their normal pa-
4tients and that this know-do gap decreases when doctors have extrinsic motivation to exert
eﬀort. Das and Hammer (2007b) proxy for motivation with whether a doctor practices in
the private or public sector and show that, when compared to the public sector, doctors
in the private sector practice at levels of diagnostic quality that are closer to their ability.
Similarly, Leonard et al. (2007) proxy for motivation with the degree to which authority over
ﬁscal and staﬃng decisions is decentralized to the facility and show that doctors who work
under decentralized authority practice at levels closer to their ability than do doctors who
work under centralized authority.
The ﬁndings in these papers rely on two untested assumptions about the relationship
between quality as measured by vignettes and quality as measured by observation with
regular patients. First, they assume that two doctors with similar scores on a vignette are, in
fact, similar in their ability to diagnose actual patients. Second, they assume that two doctors
with diﬀerent practice quality scores are, in fact, diﬀerent in the quality of their practice.
Because the vignette measures the ability of doctors to describe diagnostic procedures, not
their ability to implement diagnostic procedures, the ﬁrst assumption would be violated if
some doctors were good at describing procedures but unable to perform them in practice.
The second assumption would be violated if the observed ability of a doctor depends on
the types of patients he is diagnosing. If either of these two assumptions is violated and if
the distribution of vignette-speciﬁc skills or patient characteristics is correlated with proxy
measures of motivation, then concluding that motivation impacts practice quality is not
justiﬁed. Consider a public and private sector doctor who have identical vignette-measured
ability but demonstrate diﬀerent behavior with their patients. The diﬀerences in practice
quality could be driven by motivation or they could be driven by the fact that patients at
public facilities suﬀer from illnesses that do not require extra diagnostic procedures, whereas
those at private facilities suﬀer from illnesses that do require these procedures. The practices
of these doctors will diﬀer because they see diﬀerent patients, not because they have diﬀerent
motivation to treat their patients; if the private sector doctor saw the public sector patients,
5he would behave in exactly the same manner as the public sector doctor. Thus, it is possible
that diﬀerences between ability and practice are artifacts of the two instruments used. The
use of the Hawthorne eﬀect allows us to measure ability and practice quality with only one
instrument used under normal working conditions with regular patients, comparing doctors
to themselves.
In the following section, we review the data on doctor quality and determinants of moti-
vation used in the paper. Section 2 develops the link between the impact of scrutiny implied
by the Hawthorne eﬀect and a doctor’s motivation to show that the Hawthorne eﬀect can re-
veal the existence of gaps between best practice and actual performance. Section 3 examines
the association between the proxy measure of motivation and the know-do gap exposed by
the Hawthorne eﬀect. In addition, we discuss the signiﬁcance of these changes in behavior
and their implications for patient outcomes. Section 4 concludes.
1 Data and Instruments
The primary data used in this paper were collected over a period of two years from October
of 2001 through March of 2003. Thirty-nine health facilities in the rural and urban areas
of Arusha region were visited at least two times each. Doctors who were present at these
facilities during any of the visits were evaluated for competence and performance using
case-study patients and direct observation respectively. Direct observation allows us to
measure both quality and whether the doctors ordered lab tests for their patients. In 2005,
we collected additional data at 11 facilities in Arusha municipality, developing a quality
measurement instrument that allows us to measure quality even when we do not directly
observe the doctor.
61.1 Measures of Quality
The research team used the direct clinician observation (DCO) instrument to measure the
actual performance of doctors with their regular patients. DCO measures compliance with
Tanzanian protocol and is designed to be sensitive to the limited resources available in the
facilities we survey. Every doctor visited was trained in protocol and had the resources
at his or her disposal to follow it. Protocol requires history taking (such as asking the
patient the duration of the illness or whether diarrhea is accompanied by vomiting) and
physical examination (such as taking the patient’s temperature or auscultating the chest).
With the DCO instrument, a doctor on the research team sits in on the examined doctor’s
consultations. For each consultation, the observer ﬁlls a protocol checklist designed to match
patients presenting with fever, cough or diarrhea. For other conditions, there is a more
general history taking protocol and one physical examination protocol item. 80 doctors were
observed directly and evaluated over 1100 consultations.
In addition, each of these doctors was evaluated using vignettes, which are case-study
patients presented by an actor. Vignettes have gained increasing popularity as a tool for
quality evaluation both in developing and developed countries (Das and Hammer, 2005,
2007b; McLeod et al., 1997; Murata et al., 1992, 1994; Peabody et al., 1994, 1998, 2000;
Tiemeier et al., 2002). There are many possible ways of implementing a vignette; we use
the unblind case study with an actor. There are two researchers present: a ‘patient’ and an
examiner. The examiner, after introductions, never speaks, he only observes. The ‘patient’
presents herself as a patient would, entering the room from outside and leaving after the
consultation. She describes her symptoms and answers questions as a patient would. It is
explained to the doctor that he must do physical examination by posing questions. The
patient then answers the question verbally. For instance, if the doctor says “I would take the
patient’s temperature”, the ‘patient’ would say “the temperature is 38.5.” The examiner then
ﬁlls a checklist of the expected inputs including expected history taking questions, physical
examination items and health education points. Each doctor was tested in their ability for
7six typical cases: malaria, pelvic inﬂammatory disease, diarrhea, pneumonia, ﬂu and worm
infestation. 103 doctors were evaluated using the case-study patients.
Additional data were collected in urban Arusha in 2005, using the retrospective con-
sultation review (RCR) instrument. This instrument uses the same checklist as the DCO
instrument and it is ﬁlled by interviewing patients who have just left the consultation. The
RCR questionnaires were administered to 320 patients at 11 facilities. 211 of these patients
visited one of the 12 doctors directly observed by the team, and the remainder visited clin-
icians at the same facilities but who were never observed. On average, we have data on 6
consultations before the team arrived and 11 after we arrived. For consultations that were
also observed by the research team, Leonard and Masatu (2006) show that the results from
the RCR and DCO instruments are well correlated.
1.2 Doctors and Organizations
The doctors in our sample include nurses of various specializations, clinical assistants, clinical
oﬃcers, assistant medical oﬃcers (AMOs), and medical oﬃcers (MOs). Clinical assistants
have an elementary school education and three years of medical training. Clinical oﬃcers
traditionally have O level education and two years of medical training. AMOs are clinical
oﬃcers with two additional years of training. MOs have both an A level education and
ﬁve years of university–level medical training. Nurses are not supposed to diagnose but in
the rural areas they are frequently the only health personnel present and they do diagnose
patients in these circumstances. With the exception of nurses, all clinicians examined in this
study diagnose patients, prescribe medicines, and are addressed using the title “doctor.”
Following the convention in Tanzania, we refer to these clinicians as doctors, even though
most of these para-professionals are not full medical oﬃcers.
Most doctors in the sample, as in Tanzania, work in the public service in government–
run health facilities. In addition, there are seven other types of organizations delivering
care in the area, one parastatal hospital (owned by the government but operated as an
8independent entity) ﬁve private facilities (considered one type of organization) and ﬁve faith-
based nongovernmental (NGO) organizations operated by the Lutheran, Roman Catholic,
Seventh Day Adventist and Church of Gospel International (COGI) churches and the Ithna
Asheri Mosque.3
1.3 Measures of Institutional Characteristics
We examine the role of institutions using three categorizations of organizations. First, we
examine each of these eight organizations as distinct categories. Second, we analyze the
performance of the public sector by comparing it to all other organizations combined (non-
public). And third, we take advantage of a study of all these organizations conducted by
Mliga (2000) and place all facilities on a scale measuring the decentralization of decision–
making authority. This third methodology takes into account the fact that the labels applied
to some of the organizations are misleading. For example, in a pattern that is not uncom-
mon in Tanzania (Kanji et al., 1992), the COGI facilities are actually private facilities that
have franchised the church’s name, allowing them to provide services under a preferable tax
status. Kanji et al. (1992) suggests that if a facility is franchised to an NGO that does not
operate any independent health facilities then that facility cannot be subject to any medical
supervision from the franchising organization. For our purposes, therefore, such a facility
is private. The index of decentralization reﬂects these facts, and in addition, the facts that
some NGO facilities are highly centralized and more similar to the public sector, while others
are decentralized and more similar to the private sector.
The variables used to create the index of decentralization include: a dummy variable
indicating whether the chief of post can hire and ﬁre personnel; the level at which salaries
are set (national / regional / local); the degree to which the chief of post can use local funds
to pay salaries and buy medicines (low / medium / high); and the level at which choices
about staﬃng are made (national / regional / local). These measures are highly correlated
3Ithna Asheri is a Shia branch of Islam, the largest school of Shia thought.
9and jointly determined, so we examine the impact of an overall decentralization score, not
the marginal impact of each characteristic. We create a single index of decentralization by
using the ﬁrst factor from a factor analysis of these variables entered as dummy variables
representing each category within each of the four variables (11 categorical variables).4 Ta-
ble 1 summarizes the determinants of the index, showing a regression of the index on the
ability to hire and ﬁre, decentralization of salary decisions, the degree of local control over
ﬁnancial decisions and the decentralization of staﬃng decisions.5 The greatest weight is put
on the ability of the chief of post to hire and ﬁre and the three other characteristics have
smaller but signiﬁcant weights. The index of decentralization varies across organizations and
across facilities within organizations, but does not vary within a facility.
Eﬀective organizations are likely to be those that manage to provide high–powered incen-
tives for quality to their employees. In this setting, the technology for providing incentives
combines medical supervision with either punishment or reward. Although health care suf-
fers from asymmetric information in the doctor–patient interaction, doctors can evaluate
the eﬀort and activities of other doctors. Thus, supervising doctors visit facilities and, by
observing the activities in that facility, they can assess the quality of care that is provided.
In theory, a stakeholder supervises every facility we study (in a single-doctor private prac-
tice the stakeholder and the doctor are the same person). In practice, supervision in some
organizations is perfunctory. One doctor, who was frequently supervised, stated that in
a typical visit the supervisor asked that all logbooks requiring a signature be brought to
him as he sat in his still-running (air-conditioned) vehicle. Our index implicitly states that
such supervision visits are less likely when the supervisor has the power to act on what he
would ﬁnd if he left the car. Thus, the diﬀerences between organizations are not whether
they are supervised, but whether the supervisor has the authority to act on what he or she
4The factor analysis examines 12 distinct types of facilities, across the organizations studied. There are
six signiﬁcant factors, but the ﬁrst Eigen value is twice the size of the second and most of the variation is
explained by the ﬁrst factor.
5For this regression, the categories local, regional, and national are represented as 3/2/1, respectively,
and low, medium, and high as 1/2/3, respectively.
10discovers. Our measure of decentralization, therefore, captures the potential eﬀectiveness
of supervision while the actual level of supervision may vary. Importantly, we control for
doctors who work in single–doctor private practices because the degree of decentralization
may have a non–linear impact on doctors for whom there is no outside stakeholder; decen-
tralization with outside supervision is fundamentally diﬀerent from decentralization without
outside supervision.
1.4 Summary Statistics
Table 2 shows the number of consultations observed, the percentage of items correctly used
and the average decentralization score for each of the organizations examined in the data.
The only two organizations identiﬁed by name are the public sector and the collection of
purely private facilities. We separate summary statistics by the two diﬀerent data sets
examined. Note that the decentralization score shown is the average over all facilities owned
by a particular organization, and for some organizations, there is variance across types of
facilities. Note that doctors in the best organization perform 75% of the items required by
protocol, suggest that protocol is not an absolute measure of quality.
This table illustrates the limited ability of the data to examine the behavior of individual
organizations—for some of the organizations studied, we have few observations of patients.
This is always because there were few patients on the day we visited, a not uncommon event
in rural facilities. Clearly, there is large variation in the performance of some organizations.
For example, the one private facility in the rural area of our study has almost no patients
and provides poor diagnostic quality, but the four urban private sector facilities are much
better and see more patients. The unbalanced nature of the data on organizations (there are
too few facilities and doctors in some of the organizations) as well the unbalanced nature
of the Hawthorne eﬀect for some doctors (there are too few patients to allow us to observe
changes in quality) limit the practical uses of this data to comparing the public sector to
the non-public sector and to demonstrating the potential usefulness of the Hawthorne eﬀect
11methodology.
2 The Hawthorne Eﬀect as Additional Scrutiny
The Hawthorne eﬀect refers to a situation in which an individual’s behavior changes when
they realize they are being observed. It is characterized by a positive but temporary change
in some measurable behavior in a situation in which there was no deliberate attempt to
aﬀect behavior (Benson, 2000). The doctors observed in Tanzania were told explicitly that
the research would not impact them in any way, however, they may have reacted to the mere
presence of other doctors as if there were a “perceived demand for performance” (Campbell
et al., 1995). Thus, in this setting, it is useful to describe the Hawthorne eﬀect as a temporary
response to increased scrutiny from a professional peer.
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The ﬁgure shows smoothed average percentage of items required by protocol as measured from patient exit
interviews performed immediately after the consultation. The dashed line shows percentage provided for
patients seen immediately before and after the research team arrives at a facility who visited a doctor who
was never directly evaluated by the research team. The solid line shows the percentage provided for doctors
who were observed by the research team starting at t = 1.
12Leonard and Masatu (2006) document the full pattern of the Hawthorne eﬀect with
a small sample of doctors practicing in Arusha region in Tanzania. Because we used a
patient exit survey, we could collect data for three types of patients: patients who had
consultations before the team arrived at a facility, patients consulted after the team arrived
whose consultations were observed by the research team, and patients consulted after the
research team arrived whose consultations were not observed by the research team. Patients
in this third group were seen by doctors who were not evaluated by the research team, but
who practice at facilities where other doctors were evaluated. Figure 1 shows the pattern
of quality as estimated from patient responses for observed and unobserved doctors. For
doctors who were observed, there is a signiﬁcant jump in quality when the team arrived.
However, for doctors who were never observed, there is no signiﬁcant change in quality.
Figure 1 also shows that the Hawthorne eﬀect is temporary; quality rapidly returns to levels
similar to those found in the absence of a research team.6
The changes in quality observed with the Hawthorne eﬀect can be seen as reﬂecting
diﬀerences between best and actual practice. Before the research team arrives, observed
quality is equal to normal practice quality. When a researcher arrives, every doctor practices
to the best of his ability and after time has passed, every doctor returns to his normal level
of ability. Thus, the gap between best and actual practice seen with the Hawthorne eﬀect
is a function of the degree to which doctors do not normally practice close to their ability.
Doctors who always provide maximum eﬀort show no gap and doctors who regularly shirk
show a large gap. Formally, the Hawthorne eﬀect represents changes in the level of scrutiny
faced by doctors. All doctors choose to provide quality (q) that is equal to a fraction (λ) of
their best possible quality (θ) where λ ∈ (0,1) and q ∈ (0,θ). This fraction is a function of
the professional scrutiny at the time that quality is chosen: λ = λ(s).
The baseline level of scrutiny for each doctor is unknown but the Hawthorne eﬀect in-
6Leonard and Masatu (2006) use regression analysis to verify the signiﬁcance of the change in quality
before and after observation, the gradual fall in quality as time passes for observed doctors, the unchanging
quality before the team arrives and the unchanging quality for doctors who are never observed.
13creases scrutiny. Thus, if ∂λ2/∂2s < 0 then the change in the share of best possible quality
is greater with additional scrutiny when the baseline level of scrutiny is lower and lower
when the baseline level of scrutiny is higher. Practically, this means that doctors who face
high levels of motivation on a regular basis have little room to react to additional levels of
scrutiny, whereas those who are not otherwise motivated can easily change their behavior.
Note, the baseline level of scrutiny may diﬀer for diﬀerent activities. In particular, it is
possible that some organizations provide high levels of scrutiny for diagnostic quality, but
low levels of scrutiny for appropriate laboratory test use. In such a case, additional scrutiny
would have little impact on diagnostic quality, but may have a larger impact on laboratory
use.
In the following section, we examine the changes in the provision of diagnostic quality
and the use lab tests. Quality is measured by the probability that doctor j would implement
diagnostic input k, from among all diagnostic inputs that are required by protocol for the
given patient i: prob(xijk = 1). The use of lab tests is the probability that doctor j would
order any lab test for patient i: prob(lij = 1). Each probability is a function of the item,
patient characteristics, the level of additional scrutiny and the baseline ability and motivation
of the doctor. Given the nature of our data, we investigate the role of each of these factors in
two diﬀerent empirical speciﬁcations: the change in quality when the research team arrives
and the change in quality as the research team continues to observe consultations. We
examine diagnostic quality in each speciﬁcation, but the use of lab tests in the second
speciﬁcation only.7
2.1 Changes in scrutiny when the research team arrives
For the small study of 11 facilities, we have data from exit interviews that allows us to
compare the quality of care provided before and after the research team arrives. To study
the impact of additional scrutiny, we focus on the immediate impact of the additional scrutiny
7We do not have data on the use of lab tests for patients whose consultations were never observed.
14when the research team arrives and test whether the reaction to this scrutiny varies with
our measures of institutional characteristics. Although the data set is small, we can take
advantage of the facts that nine of the doctors were practicing in facilities with at least two
doctors, that the selection of the doctor to observe was random, and that we have data on the
quality of care provided by these unobserved doctors as well as observed doctors. Restricting
attention to facilities with paired doctors and to consultations that occurred soon before or
after the arrival of the team (four consultations before and after) allows us to pursue what
is essentially a triple diﬀerence strategy. We compare the diﬀerence between the change in
quality when the research team arrives for doctors who were observed and doctors who were
never observed and then examine how this net change in quality with increased scrutiny
varies with the institutional variables we are studying.
We implement this triple diﬀerence strategy in a random eﬀect probit regression of the
probability that each doctor implemented a given required input, as a function of a constant
(α), facility eﬀects (f), whether there was a researcher present at the facility (P), whether
the consultation was observed by a researcher (O) and whether the consultation was observed
by a researcher interacted with the institutional variables. Thus, for example, using the
decentralization index for each facility (Dj) we estimate:
prob(xijk = 1) = f (α + β1P + β2Df + β3O + δDf · O) + f + ijk (1)
The coeﬃcient on decentralization when the doctor is observed (δ) is our estimate of the
diﬀerential impact of scrutiny on doctors who work in decentralized facilities. If doctors
who work in decentralized facilities face high levels of scrutiny in the absence of the research
team, then their reaction to additional scrutiny should be smaller than doctors who work in
centralized facilities and the coeﬃcient should be negative.
This strategy explicitly controls for selection bias caused by the fact that doctors choose
where to work because it compares doctors to themselves (before and after being observed)
15and to other doctors who work in the same facility, not to doctors in other facilities.
2.2 Changes in scrutiny as the research team continues to observe
The impact of scrutiny can also be seen in the change in behavior after the researcher has
been present for a longer period. The larger data set has information on quality collected
by observers and therefore does not contain any data on the quality of care provided before
the research team arrives. However, we can measure the impact of scrutiny by modeling
scrutiny as decreasing with the length of time that the researcher has already been present.
Thus, scrutiny si = −1 ∗ {# of consultations since the team arrived}.8
We model the probability that a doctor will provide an input that is required by protocol
(prob(xijk = 1)), as a function of an item speciﬁc eﬀect (αk), illness characteristics (~ Ziγi),
the level of additional scrutiny at the time patient i is seen (si), doctor-level eﬀects j (which
reﬂect both ability and baseline scrutiny) and an additional error term. We test the hypoth-
esis that the reaction to additional scrutiny is a function of the degree of decentralization for
each doctor, Dj as well as for the fact that some doctors practice in single-doctor practices
Sj. Thus, we estimate:
prob(xijk = 1) = f

αk + ~ Ziγi + β1si + β2Djsi + β3Sjsi

+ j + eijk (2)
where β1 is the average impact of additional scrutiny, β2 is the impact of scrutiny when the
doctor works in a facility that is more decentralized, and β3 is the impact of scrutiny for
doctors who work in single-doctor practices. The hypothesis that additional scrutiny has a
smaller impact for doctors who normally face high levels of motivation, therefore, translates
into the hypothesis that β2 < 0.
In addition, we examine the reaction to scrutiny by public/non-public and in each of the
8Alternative speciﬁcations, including the negative of the log of the number of previous consultations under
scrutiny, and the inverse of the number of previous consultations under scrutiny, produce essentially identical
results.
16organizations in our data for which we have adequate observations. As with the previous
strategy, this analysis compares doctors only to themselves, not to other doctors in other
types of facilities. However, we do not compare doctors to other doctors in the same facility
and cannot measure quality before the research team arrives. Thus, we control for the patient
and illness characteristics that might otherwise impact the variation in quality.
To analyze the probability of using a lab test, we follow the same basic strategy, but use
only organizational categories, not the degree of decentralization and whether a facility is
non-public.
3 Analysis
In this section, we ask whether the size of the Hawthorne eﬀect can be explained with our
proxy measures of motivation. We examine the impact in two diﬀerent data sets, looking
ﬁrst at the reaction to the arrival of the research team, and second at the reaction to the
continuing presence of the research team.
3.1 Motivation and the reaction to the arrival of the research team
Here we compare the behavior of doctors before and after the research team arrives, compar-
ing the diﬀerences between observed and unobserved doctors in decentralized and centralized
facilities. We follow the speciﬁcation of eﬀort shown in Equation 1 using a random eﬀects
probit regression The analysis is restricted to the four consultations before and after the re-
search team arrives and to facilities in which observed doctors can be paired with unobserved
doctors.
Table 3 shows three speciﬁcations of institutional characteristics. Column 1 shows each
of the organizations as a dummy variable interacted with whether or not the consultation
was observed (owner 2 and 8 are not represented in this data). Column 2 shows whether
the consultation was observed and a dummy variable representing whether the organization
17is non-public interacted with whether the consultation is observed. Column 3 uses the
decentralization score instead of the non-public dummy. In this data, there is almost no
diﬀerence between the category non-public and the decentralization score because all non-
public facilities are monitored by authorities in the municipality and therefore authority is
local.
The presence of a research team at the facility does not change the probability that a
doctor will provide a given input, but the fact that a consultation is observed by a member
of the research team has a strong and signiﬁcant impact on that probability. Column 1 and
2 show that most of this change in quality when the doctor is observed is driven by public
sector doctors. The only signiﬁcant change in quality shown in column 1 is for public sector
doctors—although some of the coeﬃcients for other organizations are positive they are not
signiﬁcant. This basic result is conﬁrmed in columns 2 and 3. Note that the total change in
quality when the research team arrives for non-public and decentralized facilities is the sum
of the coeﬃcient for high scrutiny and the coeﬃcient for the institutional variable interacted
with high scrutiny. Doctors in non-public facilities and doctors in decentralized facilities
have a much smaller reaction to increased scrutiny.
3.2 Motivation and the decline in scrutiny over time
Here we examine the pattern of quality after the research team arrives, using the number
of previous consultations observed as a proxy for declining scrutiny. When the number
of previous consultations is low, scrutiny is high, so a positive coeﬃcient for the level of
scrutiny indicates that quality or lab tests are declining as the team remains. We examine
the diﬀerential response to scrutiny by the same three institutional measures as above, except
that we add a categorical variable indicating single-doctor practices to the decentralization
score. For organizations 2 and 8, the average number of consultations observed is less than 7,
and therefore we drop these organizational category variables in column 1, though we retain
the data. We follow the speciﬁcation of eﬀort shown in Equation 2. In addition, we examine
18the impact of scrutiny on the use of lab tests using only the organization categories. We
examine patterns for both diagnostic quality and lab test use with a random eﬀect probit
regression.
Column 1 shows that the average doctors in three organizations increase the quality of
care provided when they are under high levels of scrutiny, but doctors in other organizations
do not have a statistically signiﬁcant reaction to quality. Column 2 shows that the average
doctor increases the quality of care provided when under high scrutiny, but that doctors
in non-public facilities are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the average doctor, and their net
change in quality is essentially ﬂat. Column 3 shows the same basic result as column 2,
that decentralization is associated with doctors who have a much smaller change in quality
when they are under high levels of scrutiny. The coeﬃcient for single-doctor practice is not
signiﬁcant, indicating that, by this measure, doctors who are their own stakeholders are not
diﬀerent from other doctors who face similar levels of decentralization.
Column 4 examines the changes in the use of lab tests when the doctor is under high
levels of scrutiny. In three of the organizations examined, the average doctor increases his
use of lab tests when he is under high levels of scrutiny. However, in one of the organizations,
the average doctor actually decreases the use of lab tests when he is under high levels of
scrutiny. Note that these same doctors did not change their diagnostic quality.
3.3 Organizations, Institutions and the Know-Do Gap
We have presented data on the size of the Hawthorne eﬀect by organization categories,
whether an organization is public sector or not, and the degree of decentralization in decision-
making authority. In some cases (as in the analysis of lab tests), examining the data by
organization categories produces some interesting results, however, in general this data is
not well suited to analyzing organizations. There are only two organizations with a signiﬁcant
number of doctors and facilities (the public sector and owner 4) and in some of the facilities
there were so few patients observed by our team that we could not observe changes in
19behavior due to the duration of scrutiny. On the other hand, the diﬀerence between the
public and the non-public sector is signiﬁcant whether measured by a categorical variable
indicating the non-public sector, or by the measure of decentralization. Despite the large
variance in non-public sector performance, the data clearly show that the average non-public
sector doctor has a smaller know-do gap than the average public sector doctor.
We have introduced the measure of decentralization as a potential way to diﬀerentiate
among organizations, and clearly, the know-do gap is decreasing in the degree of decentral-
ization. However, in this case, this variable does not do a better job of explaining the data
than the simple dummy variable indicating the non-public sector. Thus, in this analysis,
we are unable to make the case that the decentralization of decision-making authority ade-
quately explains the diﬀerences between organization studied. Part of our failure to helpfully
describe the diﬀerences among organizations is because the Hawthorne eﬀect methodology
requires a reasonable sample of patients (about 10 per doctor), and many of the organizations
studied simply have too few patients.
3.4 Organizations and Lab Tests
We show that most doctors increase their use of lab tests when faced with additional scrutiny,
either because they are increasing their diagnostic quality and realize that a lab test is needed,
or because they know that a lab test is indicated by the patients’ condition, but would
normally have ignored this. However, one organization in our data displays the opposite
pattern, reducing the use of lab tests when they fall under additional scrutiny. As an
isolated ﬁnding, this result does not indicate a problem. However, doctors on the research
team repeatedly expressed concerns about the use of lab tests by this organizations because
they were not indicated by any of the patient’s symptoms. As a result of these concerns, at
the conclusion of the study we had a conversation with the chief of post in one of the facilities
owned by the organization in question. He stated that the organization had explicitly asked
doctors to use more lab tests because many of their patients had infrequent contact with
20the health care system and it was therefore useful to perform lab tests (like a urine analysis
or blood test) to look for undetected conditions. We pointed out that this was ﬁne if the
patients agreed, but that since they were paying for tests, it seemed dishonest to let them
believe the tests were indicated by their symptoms. He agreed and hoped his doctors were
properly informing patients. He also stated that it was time to revisit the policy because of
concerns about its use. This was the only organization for which there was any discussion
about the use of lab tests and these issues arose after the data were collected and before
these results were analyzed. We are not suggesting that there was dishonest intent, but
our methodology correctly identiﬁed an aberrant behavior worthy of further investigation,
demonstrating the usefulness of the Hawthorne eﬀect methodology. Clearly, the doctors we
studied were uncomfortable with the policy, particularly when they were asked to see it in
the light of their professional and ethical standards.
3.5 The signiﬁcance of the Hawthorne eﬀect induced changes in
quality
The patterns of changes in diagnostic quality observed with the Hawthorne eﬀect are signiﬁ-
cant, but do they matter? It is not particularly surprising that doctors change the way they
practice medicine because they are nervous about the arrival of another doctor, and doctors
who are rarely supervised may be more nervous than those who are frequently so. We claim
that these change in behavior are signiﬁcant for two reasons. First, because they aﬀect the
one outcome for which we have data and second, because the magnitude of the changes in
behavior can be tied to important changes in outcomes as seen in the case study (vignette)
patients.
We asked patients if they were satisﬁed or very satisﬁed with the quality of care they
received and Leonard (2008) examines the changes in patient satisfaction as doctors increase
their use of diagnostic inputs. They show that patients are more likely to be very satisﬁed
with the quality of care when the doctor increases his quality because the research team has
21arrived.
In addition, data from the vignettes show that the probability of correct diagnosis is
increasing in the use of diagnostic inputs. Table 5 examines the probability that a doctor
would give the correct diagnosis over six vignettes as a function of diagnostic inputs and
doctor characteristics. Since the vignettes were designed by the team to mimic speciﬁc
conditions we know which diagnoses were correct. Diagnostic inputs were measured using an
instrument similar to the DCO instrument, recording whether doctors used history taking
and physical examination inputs required by protocol. Table 5 shows that doctors give
the correct diagnosis because they provide diagnostic eﬀort, not because of their training,
experience or tenure. In addition, it shows that physical examination is much more important
than history taking. Increasing the use of physical examination by 1 percentage point leads
to a 1.9% increase in the probability of providing the correct diagnosis. On the other hand,
an increase in the use of history taking leads to a small and statistically insigniﬁcant increase
in the probability of correct diagnosis.
Table 6 examines the patterns of diagnostic input provision with the Hawthorne eﬀect,
diﬀerentiating between physical examination and history taking. Overall, the average doc-
tor provides more of both type of input when he is ﬁrst observed. However, doctors in
decentralized facilities are diﬀerent from the average doctor for physical examination, but
not diﬀerent for history taking. The average doctor in a decentralized facility exhibits very
little change in physical examination while he is being observed by the research team, but
does exhibit a decline in history taking over that same period. Thus, doctors in centralized
facilities are increasing their use of physical examination when the research team ﬁrst arrives.
Table 6 suggests that the average doctor in a centralized facility changes his use of physical
examination inputs by about 20 percentage points between when the team ﬁrst arrives and
10 consultations later. This change in diagnostic quality is approximately equivalent to 1
standard deviation in the distribution diagnostic quality over the whole sample. If the link
between physical examination and diagnosis is the same with an actual patient as it is with
22a case study patient, then we predict that the diﬀerence between the probability of being
properly diagnosed when the team ﬁrst arrives and the probability after 10 consultations is
approximately 38 percentage points (0.02 * 10 * 1.9 = 0.38).
In reality the diﬀerence will be much smaller than this estimate, because most patients
who visit any doctor are in fact suﬀering from the presumptive diagnosis; the diagnosis given
when doctors do not exert eﬀort. For example, most patients who visit with symptoms of
malaria are in fact suﬀering from malaria, and if the doctor exerts no eﬀort, but gives the
presumptive diagnosis, he will be correct. The vignettes were speciﬁcally designed to test
a doctor’s ability to diﬀerentiate common from less common illnesses. Thus, the return
to diagnostic eﬀort is likely to be much smaller for the common illness. Nonetheless, the
changes in eﬀort observed are signiﬁcant, both statistically and for health impacts.
It is also interesting to note that doctors in decentralized facilities are not imperturbable.
They do change their behavior when the research team arrives and ask more history taking
questions. The arrival of an outside research team does have an impact on the way even
very good doctors provide care, although it does not change actual quality.
4 Conclusion
By using the experimental intervention implied by Hawthorne eﬀect—as a reaction to both
the arrival of the research team and the continued presence of the research team—we show
that the average doctor is capable of providing much higher levels of diagnostic quality
and that these changes in quality could improve important outcomes for many patients.
Importantly, the changes in quality caused by the arrival of the research team vary widely
across doctors and we show that these changes reﬂect the baseline motivation of doctors.
In other words, those doctors who normally practice at levels close to their abilities do
not change their behavior as much as doctors who normally practice at levels much lower
than their abilities. Thus, the Hawthorne eﬀect demonstrates the size of the gap between a
23doctor’s best possible practice and their actual performance.
We examine the determinants of this gap by three measures of institutional characteris-
tics: organization categories, whether the organization is non-public sector, and the degree
of decentralization of decision-making authority. We ﬁnd that the average doctor who works
for a non-public sector organization or who works in a facility with decentralized decision-
making authority exhibits a much smaller change in quality when the research team arrives.
In fact, doctors in some of the best organizations appear to change their behavior only in
unimportant ways and maintain high quality whether observed by the team or not. These
doctors react to the presence of the research team by increasing their use of history taking,
but maintain their use of (the much more important) physical examination. These results,
in turn, suggest that the diﬀerences in performance between the public and the private sec-
tor are not driven by the abilities of doctors in those sectors, but by their motivation to
provide quality. This in turn has important policy implications for health care in Tanzania,
implications that appear to apply to most developing country health systems.
Combined with the analysis of motivation and health quality in Leonard et al. (2007) and
Das and Hammer (2007b), this paper suggests that improvements in health care quality may
come as much from focusing on motivation as they do from focusing on training. Given the
dismal state of health in developing countries, and the enormous potential for improvements
in health status with access to appropriate and high quality medicine, a better understanding
of the mechanisms necessary to address motivation in health workers is an essential part of
the way forward.
The Hawthorne eﬀect has traditionally been raised as a potential problem in research
settings; can the researcher know that what he is seeing is what would happen if he were not
there? However, some new research in experimental economics suggests that the Hawthorne
eﬀect demonstrates the importance of interpersonal utility; the fact that subjects may derive
utility from being perceived to be more charitable, public good–minded, honest or profes-
sional than they really are (see Gneezy and List, 2006; Leonard and Masatu, forthcoming;
24Levitt and List, 2007, for example). Thus, the presence of another doctor causes a doctor to
behave in a more professional manner. In medicine, the impact of increased professionalism
is easy to observe; doctors provide more eﬀort and therefore better diagnostic quality. How-
ever, perhaps because the observer provides no feedback, the gain in interpersonal utility is
short lived and the subject rapidly returns to his or her original level of eﬀort (this return
to original eﬀort is also noted in Gneezy and List, 2006). This paper makes the argument
that the Hawthorne eﬀect may not be something to be studiously avoided in research set-
tings, but something to be studied more closely, and in particular something to be exploited
so as to improve our understanding of the determinants of performance. In settings where
the performance of individuals is a combination of ability and eﬀort, the Hawthorne eﬀect
may be particularly useful because it does not impact ability, but appears to signiﬁcantly
impact eﬀort. When the changes in eﬀort are driven by professional or ethical concerns, the
Hawthorne eﬀect allows us to observe both the best possible care and actual performance,
and to examine the determinants of this gap.
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27Table 1: Regression of the decentralization score on institutional characteristics
Variable coef std. err
The ability to hire and ﬁre personnel (yes/no) 1.245 (0.030)***
The level at which salary decisions are made .175 (0.007)***
Local control over ﬁnancial decisions .119 (0.019)***
The level at which staﬃng decisions are made .121 (0.010)***
constant -2.017 (0.017)
observations (facilities) 39










































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table 3: The reaction to changes in scrutiny when the research team arrives
Dep Var: whether doctor provides a spe-
ciﬁc input required by protocol as reported
by the patient in an exit interview
(1) (2) (3)
Team is present at facility (0/1) -0.065 -0.05 -0.05
[0.077] [0.077] [0.077]
High scrutiny: 0.303 0.314
(whether the consultation is observed) [0.114]*** [0.117]***






















Constant 0.094 0.02 0.003
[0.048]* [0.074] [0.077]
1,849 possible items observed over doctors at 9 facilities in which one doctor was observed by the research
team and at least one doctor was not observed by the research team. Random eﬀect probit regression
on whether or not a given input was provided as measured by patient exit interviews. Standard errors in
brackets, *, **, *** indicates signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. The data is restricted to facilities
where observed doctors can be paired with unobserved doctors, and include data for four observations before
the team arrives and four observations after the team arrives for each doctor.
30Table 4: The reaction to changes in scrutiny as the research team remains
Dep Var: whether the doctor
provides a speciﬁc input required by
protocol
orders a lab test
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Level of additional scrutiny‡ 0.015 0.015
[0.002]*** [0.002]***
Institutional variables interacted with the level of additional scrutiny
public sector 0.015 0.068
[0.002]*** [0.028]**
owner 2 0.009 0.108
[0.004]** [0.020]***
owner 3 0.001 0.069
[0.009] [0.073]
owner 4 -0.007 -0.085
[0.008] [0.040]**
owner 5 0.05 0.267
[0.027]* [0.162]








patient characteristics Included Included
DCO item ﬁxed eﬀects Included
illness characteristics Included
Constant -0.525 -0.566 -0.532 -1.019
[0.158]*** [0.158]*** [0.160]*** [0.358]***
Observations 12,143 12,143 12,143 745
80 doctors observed over 12,143 diagnostic input observations (columns 1 through 3) and 745 consultations
(column 4). Standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
‡The level of scrutiny is the number of consultations since the research team arrived, times -1. All
regressions are random eﬀect probit regressions with a doctor random eﬀect.
31Table 5: Determinants of the correct diagnosis for a case study patient
Dep Var: whether the doctor gives the
correct diagnosis (0/1)
History taking inputs 0.037
(percent of inputs required by protocol) [0.383]
Physical Examination Inputs 1.876





Years of Training -0.026
[0.048]
Tenure (log of years) -0.026
[0.048]
Experience (log of years) 0.031
[0.072]
Observations 598
number of unique clinicians 103
Standard errors in brackets. *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% level. Random eﬀect probit regression on
whether or not the doctor was able to correctly diagnose a case study patient (vignette).
32Table 6: The Hawthorne eﬀect by history taking and physical examination inputs
Dep Var: whether doctor provides a
speciﬁc input required by protocol
















DCO item ﬁxed eﬀects Included
Constant -0.296
[0.167]*
80 doctors, 12,143 diagnostic input observations. Standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. ‡The level of scrutiny is the number of consultations since the research team
arrived, times -1. The regression is a random eﬀect probit regressions with a doctor random eﬀect.
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